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ABSTRACT: “Counterterrorism cooperation” is 
a trending concept in today’s global security 
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discourse. However, systematic international 
cooperation against transnational “terrorist 
threats” started almost half a century ago. This 
pioneering study provides an account of the 
historical origins and emergence of the current 
system of international counterterrorism 
cooperation in Western Europe during the 
1970s and the 1980s. Based on some recently 
published case studies as well as a 
considerable number of newly declassified U.S. 
and UK government documents, which are 
analyzed here for the first time, the article gives 
an overview over the informal and secret 
institutions that formed an increasingly complex 
system of multilateral counter-terrorism 
cooperation. The author argues that the 
emerging multilateral counter-terrorism 
cooperation of the 1970s/1980s led to 
increased horizontal intelligence sharing – 
internationally between Western intelligence 
services and domestically between intelligence 
and police services – and constituted a first 
step to the European integration of “internal 
security”. 
KEYWORDS: international counterterrorism 
cooperation, intelligence history, Club de Berne, 




When the heads of the European domestic 
intelligence services came together in Berlin in 
May 2018 for a symposium organized by the 
German Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz 
(BfV), the Director General of Great Britain’s 
MI5, Andrew Parker, declared empathically that 






























European intelligence services was more 
important than ever. In the first public speech of 
a MI5 head abroad, Parker emphasized: “For 
many years we and partner services like the 
BfV have worked to develop and invest in 
strong intelligence and security partnerships 
across Europe: bilaterally, multilaterally and 
with EU institutions. In today’s uncertain world, 
we all need that shared strength more than 
ever.”2  
What the head of MI5 referred to is a complex 
system to coordinate counterterrorism efforts in 
Europe and beyond that includes bilateral 
arrangements, European Union (EU) 
institutions, various international organizations 
as well as a number of more informal 
multilateral clubs. Within the structures of the 
EU, a major institution is the Intelligence 
Analysis Centre (INTCEN), formerly also known 
as the EU Situation Centre (EU SITCEN). The 
Brussels-based body does not collect its own 
intelligence but relies on information provided 
by the services of the member states. The 
European Council maintains an office of the 
Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC), which is 
responsible for coordinating the work of the 
Council in combatting terrorism3 and improving 
                     
2 MI5 Director General Andrew Parker Speech to BfV Symposium, Berlin, 14 May 2018, 
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/director-general-andrew-parker-speech-to-bfv-
symposium#sthash.azVYmWYN.dpuf (accessed 18 May 2018). 
3 The author is aware that the use of the labels “terrorist”, “terrorist organization”, 
“terrorist attack” etc. is problematic as there is no definition shared by a majority of 
scholars. For a discussion see e.g. Alex P. Schmid (ed.), The Routledge Handbook 
of Terrorism Research (London: Routledge, 2011), 39-157. Additionally, critical 
terrorism scholars have made a good argument that “terrorism” is largely a social 
construct and that the use of the “terrorist” label serves strategic functions. For an 
overview see Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smith and Jeroen Gunning (eds.), 
Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda (London: Routledge, 2009); 










































the respective communication between the EU 
and third countries. Most recently, EUROPOL, 
the EU’s law enforcement agency, opened the 
European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC), 
which since early 2016 functions as a platform 
for information sharing and operational 
coordination.4 
Outside of EU institutions, multilateral 
cooperation has taken place in other 
international organizations and informal 
networks for which counterterrorism is not the 
primary purpose. Among them are the United 
Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), and the G7. Equally if not 
more important, however, are several informal 
multilateral clubs of intelligence and security 
services, for which counterterrorism 
cooperation and intelligence sharing is the 
primary raison d’être. These clubs, which 
operate largely in secrecy and without media 
coverage, include the Club de Berne’s 
Counterterrorist Group (CTG), the Paris Group, 
the SIGINT Seniors, the Police Working Group 
on Terrorism (PWGOT), and the G 13+.  
The CTG was created following the terrorist 
attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United 
                                            
Terrorism Studies since 11 September 2001: What Has Been Learned? (New York: 
Routledge, 2014); Richard Jackson (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Critical 
Terrorism Studies (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016). The use of the “terrorist” label in 
this article does not reflect an attribution by the author but pragmatically follows its 
use by the dominant discourse. This means that attacks, individuals and groups 
are signified as “terrorist” that were described as such by the overwhelming 
majority of European scholars, media outlets, politicians and security officials. 
4 Robert Lackner, Intelligence: The Missing Dimension in EU Security Policies?, Global 































States (9/11) as an initiative of the Club de 
Berne, the oldest multilateral institution set up 
for counterterrorism cooperation, which will be 
discussed more detailed in this article. 
Composed of intelligence and police services 
from the EU countries, the United States, 
Norway, and Switzerland, the CTC focuses on 
common threat analyses, mainly on Islamist 
terrorism, and on facilitating information 
exchange and operational cooperation. The 
group, probably one of the most important in 
day-to-day counterterrorism cooperation, has 
been seeking closer connections to EU 
structures in the last few years, especially to 
Europol. Since July 2016, the Club de Berne 
and the CTC also maintain an operative 
platform in The Hague, where the domestic 
intelligence services of the member states run a 
common database and a real-time information 
system.5 The special branches of the national 
police forces of the EU member states and 
Norway cooperate within the secret Police 
Working Group on Terrorism (PWGOT). The 
group was established already in the late 1970s 
and will be discussed in greater detail below. 
The Paris Group was set up in early 2016, as a 
result of increased terrorist violence on 
European soil following the rise of the Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and especially the 
major attacks in Paris in January and 
November 2015. This club goes beyond the 
                     
5 Richard J. Aldrich, Transatlantic Intelligence and Security Cooperation, International 
Affairs 80/3 (2004), 740f; Mathieu Deflem, Europol and the Policing of International 
Terrorism: Counter-Terrorism in a Global Perspective, Justice Quarterly 23/3 
(2006), 341; “Implementation of the Counter-terrorism Agenda Set by the European 
Council”, Note from EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator to Delegations, Council of 
the European Union, Brussels, 4 November 2016, 
http://statewatch.org/news/2016/nov/eu-council-CTC-implementation-a-t-strategy-










































cooperation of the domestic intelligence 
services and likely includes the foreign 
intelligence services. Its members are the 
intelligence coordinators from 15 European 
countries.6 
Another institution set up recently in light of the 
challenges caused by ISIS and the war in Syria 
is the Group 13+ (G 13+). This Belgian-led 
initiative is not an inter-service group but brings 
together the interior ministers of several 
European states. Since June 2013, informal 
meetings are held to discuss information 
sharing and other common measures against 
the so-called foreign fighters, especially with 
regard to foreign terrorist fighter returnees. 
Apparently, the informal G 13+ has been able 
to give “impulses from without” for activities that 
were later pursued at the EU level.7 
The most secret multilateral club is SIGINT 
Seniors, the counterterrorism coalition of 
intelligence agencies concerned with the 
collection of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). This 
NSA-led effort has two divisions, SIGINT 
Seniors Europe and SIGINT Seniors Pacific. 
SIGINT Seniors Europe was set up in 1982 with 
                     
6 Members include Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Great Britain, Norway, and Sweden. On the Paris 
Group see “Implementation of the Counter-terrorism Agenda Set by the European 
Council”, 4 November 2016, 24. 
7 The G 13+ was originally called the EU9 Group. Members include the EU members 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Austria, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and Poland, but also Norway and Switzerland. On the G 
13+ see “Implementation of the Counter-terrorism Agenda Set by the European 
Council”, 4 November 2016, 38; “Gruppe der EU9, Antwort der Bundesregierung 
auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Andrej Hunko, Wolfgang Gehrcke, Jan 
Korte, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion Die Linke”, Drucksache 18/4017, 
Deutscher Bundestag, 18. Wahlperiode, 17 February 2015, 
https://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/040/1804017.pdf (accessed 25 May 






























a primary focus on information about the Soviet 
military. After 9/11, the group changed its focus 
to counterterrorism and was enlarged from 9 to 
14 members. SIGINT Seniors Europe holds an 
annual conference, and focuses on targeting 
suspected terrorists as well as on collaboration 
on the development of new surveillance tools 
and techniques. Since 2006, it also works to 
exploit the Internet as part of counterterrorism. 
The club runs its own communication system 
called SIGDASYS to share copies of 
intercepted communications. SIGINT Seniors 
Pacific, formed by the NSA in 2005 with a 
geographical focus on the Asia-Pacific region, 
operates an analogue communication system 
called CRUSHED ICE.8 
While this architecture has been shaped by 
9/11, the major terrorist attacks in Madrid in 
2004 and London in 2005, and most recently 
the terrorist violence in Europe directed or 
inspired by ISIS, the current system of 
multilateral counterterrorism cooperation 
emerged already during the 1970s. This article 
aims to write a basic genealogy by giving a brief 
overview over these historical origins that 
constitute the “prequel to the present”. No 
comprehensive analysis exists so far. The 
present paper builds on the very few existing 
academic case studies on multilateral clubs, 
                     
8 The members of SIGINT Seniors Europe are the SIGINT agencies from the United 
States, Canada, Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand (Five Eyes), Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Sweden. 
The members of SIGINT Seniors Pacific are the Five Eyes plus the SIGINT 
agencies from South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, France, and India (as of 2013). 
The information on SIGINT Seniors is based on NSA documents provided by 
Edward Snowden and published by The Intercept. See Ryan Gallagher, The 
Powerful Global Spy Alliance You Never Knew Existed, The Intercept, 1 March 
2018, https://theintercept.com/2018/03/01/nsa-global-surveillance-sigint-seniors 










































especially the recent works by Eva 
Oberloskamp on TREVI and Aviva Guttmann 
on the Club de Berne.9 In addition, it is based 
on a considerable number of recently 
declassified U.S. and UK government 
documents, which have not been processed 
previously and whose analysis significantly 
enhances our understanding of the history of 
multilateral counterterrorism cooperation. 
However, the official documents pertaining to 
the subject are to a large degree still classified. 
As a result, some of the institutions remain 
rather obscure. The present article does 
therefore not attempt to provide a final 
evaluation or definite conclusions but rather 
wants to give the reader an introduction into the 
subject and the state of research with the aim to 
encourage further studies. 
Multilateral Clubs within the System of International 
Counterterrorism Cooperation 
The informal fora provided by multilateral clubs 
were imbedded as one crucial component 
within a complex system of international 
counterterrorism cooperation that emerged in 
the 1970s. At least as important was a web of 
bilateral cooperation that increasingly 
connected the Western European nations and 
the United States, as many state actors 
preferred bilateral over multilateral forms of 
counterterrorism cooperation. Western 
                     
9   Eva Oberloskamp, Codename TREVI: Terrorismusbekämpfung und die Anfänge 
einer europäischen Innenpolitik in den 1970er Jahren (Berlin: De Gruyter 
Oldenbourg, 2017); Aviva Guttmann, Combatting Terror in Europe: Euro-Israeli 
Counterterrorism Intelligence Cooperation in the Club de Berne (1971-1972), 
Intelligence and National Security 33/2 (2018), 158-175; Aviva Guttmann, The 
Origins of International Counterterrorism: Switzerland at the Forefront of Crisis 
Negotiations, Multilateral Diplomacy, and Intelligence Cooperation (1969-1977) 






























European states also made bilateral 
arrangements with both Israel and Arab states. 
In the 1980s, bilateral cooperation even began, 
haltingly, extending to communist East Europe. 
In 1986, for example, an agreement was closed 
between Austria and the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), in which the 
SFRY committed itself to share intelligence on 
Armenian and some Palestinian terrorists.10 
A special form of bilateral cooperation were the 
agreements that a range of Western states, 
including the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG), France, and Austria, concluded with the 
most active Middle Eastern state supporters of 
terrorism such as Libya, Syria, and Iran from 
the mid-1970s on. As part of these secret 
agreements, the Western European 
governments offered a range of “carrots” – from 
technical support, training, and security 
cooperation to economic aid, diplomatic 
support, and arms – in return for pledges by 
their Middle Eastern counterparts to curb 
terrorist groups under their influence, 
respectively to cease directing terrorist attacks 
on the Western countries’ soil. Sometimes 
these deals also included the provision of 
intelligence on terrorist actors by the Middle 
Eastern regimes.11 
                     
10 “Yugoslavia: PLO Ties and Terrorism”, EURM86-20026, CIA, 3 March 1986, in: 
CREST, CIA General Records, 86T01017R, Box 4, Folder 350, Document No. 1-8. 
11 On the French deals see “TREVI Group: Attitudes Towards Syria”, EUR M86-20154, 
CIA, 2 December 1986, pp. 4f, in: CREST, CIA General Records, 86T01017R, Box 
5, Folder 477, Document No. 1-7; “TREVI Group: Attitudes Towards Libya”, EUR 
M86-20058, CIA, 22 April 1986, in: CREST, CIA General Records, 86T01017R, 
Box 4, Folder 382, Document No. 1-3; Jeremy Shapiro and Bénédicte Suzan, The 
French Experience of Counter-terrorism, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 45/1 
(2003), 73-75; Michel Wieviorka, French Politics and Strategy on Terrorism, in: 










































In an analogue fashion, some Western 
European state actors made secret bilateral 
agreements with non-state armed groups 
involved in terrorist violence, especially with the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). For 
example, between the mid-1970s and the mid-
1980s, the PLO supported the Austrian 
government’s counterterrorist efforts, especially 
its fight against the Abu Nidal Organization 
(ANO).12 In early 1979, the West German 
Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) initiated a significant 
cooperation with the PLO security service 
(Jihaz al-Rasd), mainly to gain information on 
German left-wing terrorists with links to the 
Middle East.13 
                                            
States (Washington, DC: Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, 
1990), 77-85. On the German deals see Oberloskamp, Codename TREVI, 47f. On 
an Austrian deal with Libya made in 1975 see Thomas Riegler, Tage des 
Schreckens: Die OPEC-Geiselnahme 1975 und der moderne Terrorismus (E-book, 
2015), 234-253. 
12 Thomas Riegler, Im Fadenkreuz: Österreich und der Nahostterrorismus 1973 bis 
1985 (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2011). 
13 Lutz Maeke, DDR und PLO: Die Palästinapolitik des SED-Staates (Berlin: De Gruyter 
Oldenbourg, 2017), 235-280; Tim Geiger, Westliche Anti-Terrorismus-Diplomatie 
im Nahen Osten, in: Johannes Hürter (ed.), Terrorismusbekämpfung in 
Westeuropa: Demokratie und Sicherheit in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren (Berlin: 































Figure 1: Types of international 
counterterrorism cooperation 
Parallel to these forms of bilateral 
counterterrorism cooperation, established 
international organizations and political 
networks started to address terrorism in the 
course of the 1970s. The UN created an Ad 
Hoc Committee on International Terrorism in 
1972 and adapted a few conventions. Since 
hijackings had been a preferred terrorist tactic 
of Palestinian organizations in the decade 
following 1968, some practical cooperation 
occurred within the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO). But counterterrorism 
efforts within the UN were largely deadlocked at 
the time.14 The resulting marginality of the UN 
                     
14 See Bernhard Blumenau, The United Nations and Terrorism: Germany, 
Multilateralism, and Antiterrorism Efforts in the 1970s (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014); Peter Romaniuk, Multilateral Counter-terrorism: The Global 










































to enhance counterterrorism cooperation is 
reflected in the persistent conviction of the 
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO) that the UN was “an inappropriate forum 
in which to promote any serious initiative, given 
the constant likelihood of acrimonious splits 
along factional lines”.15 
From the mid-1970s on, the Council of Europe 
(CoE) also provided a forum for international 
counterterrorism initiatives, especially efforts in 
the field of judicial cooperation with the aim to 
enable extraditions and prosecutions of terrorist 
suspects. While the non-binding resolutions of 
the CoE at times exerted pressures on 
European governments to coordinate their 
counterterrorist efforts, the latter were for the 
most part reluctant to give the CoE a significant 
counterterrorism role. They judged the 
institution as too large and heterogeneous for 
effective cooperation and preferred informal 
multilateral clubs as vehicles.16 
Soon after its formation in 1975, the G7 (USA, 
Canada, Great Britain, France, the FRG, Italy, 
and Japan) formed an experts’ group on 
terrorism, the so-called Bonn Group, and 
adopted declarations against terrorism at their 
summits, such as the Bonn Economic Summit 
Declaration on Hijacking of 1978 and the 
Venice Economic Summit Declaration on the 
                     
15 “International Initiatives on Terrorism”, Memo from A.G. Thompson to Mr. Harrington, 
F4 Division, UK Home Office, 18 December 1984, p. 3, in: HO 325/585, UK 
National Archives, Kew (henceforth TNA). 
16 “Western Europe: Ongoing Counterterrorist Cooperation”, EUR M87-20061, Office of 
European Analysis, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, 6 May 1987, pp. 4f, in: CREST, 
CIA General Records, 93T00643R, Box 2, Folder 97, Document No. 1-0. On the 
CoE as a forum for multilateral counterterrorism cooperation see also 






























Protection of Diplomats in 1980. However, G7 
efforts were little specific, barely effective, and 
largely symbolic. Especially the European 
members states stepped on the brakes, since 
they regarded the Bonn Group as a duplication 
of the multilateral counterterrorism clubs, which 
they preferred.17 
The NATO Special Committee (AC/46) 
provided a forum of somewhat more practical 
relevance for multilateral cooperation and the 
member states used it to share and analyze 
some counterterrorism intelligence. While the 
military alliance began producing its own 
assessments of terrorist groups, NATO 
dealings with terrorism remained limited during 
the 1970s/1980s.18 In the second half of the 
1980s counterterrorism also became a marginal 
policy field within the formal structures of the 
European Communities (EC). This will be 
discussed in detail later in this article. To sum it 
up, the efficacy of formal international 
organizations as fora for counterterrorism 
cooperation was, for the most part, rather 
limited. More important within the system of 
counterterrorism cooperation that emerged in 
the 1970s was a web of informal institutions. 
These multilateral clubs form the object of study 
in the remainder of this article. 
                     
17 “Prospects for Counterterrorist Cooperation among Developed Countries”, 
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, NI IIM 86-10007, Director of Central 
Intelligence, May 1986, pp. 7f, in: CREST, CIA General Records, 90R00038R, Box 
3, Folder 34, Document No. 1-5; Secret letter on multilateral and bilateral 
counterterrorism cooperation from the UK Home Office to St. E. Burton, MAED, 
FCO, 9 June 1981, in: HO 306/227, TNA. 
18 Oberloskamp, Codename TREVI, 223. AC/46’s dealing with terrorism in the 1970s, 
and the major difficulties to operate counterterrorism cooperation and intelligence 
sharing within this institution, are documented in numerous U.S. State Department 
cables, in: Central Foreign Policy Files, created, 7/1/1973-12/31/1979, 
documenting the period 1973?-12/31/1979, Record Group 59, U.S. National 











































The Club de Berne, TREVI, and the Origins of 
Multilateralism 
The beginnings of multilateral counterterrorism 
cooperation were triggered by the terrorist 
violence that was brought to Europe by 
Palestinian armed groups at the turn of the 
1970. Evidently, this was not first time that 
Western European countries were confronted 
with terrorist violence in the post-World War II 
era. In Austria and Italy, a series of terrorist 
attacks occurred during the 1960s as part of the 
conflict about South Tyrol. The Front de 
Libération Nationale (FLN) used terrorism as a 
tactic during the Algerian War of Independence 
(1954-1962), while the French right-wing 
nationalist Organisation armée secrète (OAS) 
was responsible for a massive wave of terrorist 
violence in Algeria and France in the early 
1960s. In West Germany, some Croatian exile 
activists turned to terrorist violence already in 
the early 1960s, almost a decade before the 
first Palestinian attacks in the country and the 
founding of the Red Army Faction (RAF). 
However, the campaign of violence by various 
Palestinian factions that started in the late 
1960s led to a major change of perception 
throughout Western Europe. For the first time, 
terrorism was perceived as a massive and 
common threat. Over the following years the 
insight prevailed that in light of these 
transnationally operating terrorist actors, 
domestic policies and legislative measures 
alone did not suffice. The common threat 
required a common response. 
The first multilateral club to be established in 
light of the new transnational terrorist threat 






























to 1969.19 The Club de Berne has provided an 
informal forum for Western domestic 
intelligence services. Its early members 
included Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, 
Luxemburg, Netherlands, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, and the FRG. The Club de 
Berne held biannual meetings of the heads of 
domestic intelligence services of its member 
states, but also organized working groups, 
seminars, and training courses for junior staff. 20 
Importantly, as early as 1971, the Club de 
Berne set up KILOWATT, an encrypted telex 
system for intelligence sharing on Middle 
Eastern terrorism.21 Interestingly enough, 
KILOWATT was initiated by an initiative of 
Israeli intelligence officers in June 1971, and 
the system became operational in October of 
the same year. After a few months, it was used 
on a daily basis. 
From the beginning, the participants of 
KILOWATT included not only intelligence 
services of the Club de Berne member states 
but also of the United States and Israel. During 
the course of the 1970s, Canada, Australia, 
Ireland, Sweden, Norway, Austria, and Spain 
joined KILOWATT as well. It was later 
                     
19 The only major academic work on the Club de Berne was conducted by the Swiss 
historian Aviva Guttmann. Her study has analytical weaknesses and is still based 
on very fragmentary access to the archival sources, but it gives a valuable first 
impression on the modus operandi of the club and the affiliated KILOWATT system 
and allows us to authoritatively establish some historical key data. See Guttmann, 
Club de Berne; Guttmann, Origins of International Counterterrorism, 183-229. If not 
cited otherwise, the following information on the Club de Berne is based on these 
accounts. 
20 “Terrorism Review”, 17 March 1983, GI TR 83-006, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, 
p. 5, in: CREST, CIA General Records, 84-00893R, Box 1, Folder 12, Document 
No. 1-7. 
21 Guttmann, Club de Berne, 158, even signifies it more specifically as a “threat 










































complemented by MEGATON, a second telex 
system under the institutional roof of the Club 
de Berne aimed for the exchange of intelligence 
on terrorism.22 The very secretive Club de 
Berne constituted a milestone for intelligence 
sharing between the Western security services 
and significantly supported the building of 
mutual confidence and trust – most important 
ingredients in the business of sharing secrets. 
The second pillar of the emerging multilateral 
counterterrorism architecture during the 
1970s/1980s was the TREVI group.23 
Established in 1976, TREVI emerged from the 
bilateral Franco-German cooperation of the 
interior ministries that had been initiated in 
1974. Its objective was the political coordination 
of the cooperation between the EC security 
services. The attack at the Olympic Games in 
Munich in 1972 and the perceived threat by 
Palestinian terrorism were the main drivers 
leading to the founding of TREVI, and at least 
during the first decade of its existence the 
group maintained a very strong focus on 
fighting terrorist violence as well as securing 
critical infrastructure such civil air traffic, nuclear 
power plants, and transports of nuclear 
material. In pursuit of these aims, TREVI also 
organized the exchange of officials, techniques, 
and experiences in order to enhance police 
cooperation, leading to a trans-governmental 
circulation of people and ideas.  
                     
22 “Terrorism Review”, 17 March 1983, 5; Aldrich, Transatlantic Intelligence and 
Security Cooperation, 740. 
23 The authoritative account on TREVI is Oberloskamp, Codename TREVI. If not cited 
otherwise, the following information on TREVI is based on this account. See also 
Eva Oberloskamp, The European TREVI Conference in the 1970s: 
Transgovernmental Policy Coordination in the Area of Internal Security, Journal of 






























The participants in TREVI were congruent with 
the EC member states but the informal TREVI 
was operating entirely outside of the EC 
institutions, particularly because of the 
expected difficulties with ensuring 
confidentiality.24  
The EC Commission was accordingly excluded 
from TREVI, and strict secrecy was demanded 
from the participants. Already in late 1981, five 
years before they became members of the EC, 
Spain and Portugal were granted observer 
status. They were allowed to be present at 
TREVI meetings and informed about all 
activities of the group. 
 
Figure 2: The emergence of multilateral 
counterterrorism cooperation: 1976 
On the other hand, despite several efforts to 
receive observer status, the United States was 
entirely kept out of TREVI. In 1982, the TREVI 
                     










































member states reluctantly agreed that the 
country chairing the group (always the same 
country that held the EC presidency) could 
provide briefings on TREVI proceedings to the 
U.S. government.25 Similar liaison relationships 
were apparently established in the course of the 
1980s between TREVI and Canada, Australia, 
Austria, and Switzerland.26 TREVI would 
eventually be integrated into the new EU 
structure, as part of the “third pillar” dealing with 
justice and home affairs, when the Maastricht 
Treaty came into force in November 1993. 
TREVI was structured into three levels: The top 
level consisted of the ministers responsible for 
domestic security in the EC countries, who met 
once a year during the 1970s for decision-
making. A committee of Higher Officials, which 
came together twice a year during the 1970s, 
constituted the meso level. The Higher Officials, 
usually department heads or directors of the 
security services, were responsible for 
preparing the meetings of the ministers and for 
coordinating the working groups, which 
constituted level 3. 
The important Working Group I dealt with 
counterterrorism and was also responsible for 
                     
25 “Prospects for Counterterrorist Cooperation among Developed Countries”, 
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, 7. The thoroughness and detail of the 
briefings that the U.S. government received on TREVI varied depending on the 
country holding the presidency. The U.S. was brought somewhat closer to TREVI 
in 1986. Since then, the U.S. Attorney General received briefings at meetings with 
the TREVI Troika (consisting of the chair of the TREVI ministers, his predecessor 
and his successor) on the occasion of the periodical meetings held by the TREVI 
ministers. At the same time, TREVI also began using the “Troika mechanism” to 
widen its links to other European countries such as Austrian and Switzerland. See 
“Policies on Counter Terrorism”, Memo from M.J.A. Partridge, UK Home Office, 10 
September 1986, p. 2, in: HO 325/585, TNA. 






























intelligence sharing between the member 
states. This exchange of intelligence on 
terrorism was organized through the already 
existing international channels of the domestic 
intelligence services, based on TELEX 
technology, which were also used by the Club 
de Berne’s KILOWATT system. 
Correspondence was codenamed “trevi”. 
Intelligence sharing was in fact a central 
objective of TREVI, and until spring 1977 liaison 
offices were set up in the member states. The 
liaison offices were administered by the 
domestic intelligence services and run by 
permanent office heads, who met periodically. 
This system of information exchange extended 
the circle of actors that could participate in 
secret intelligence by giving police forces 
access to information that had traditionally been 
restricted to intelligence agencies.  
However, intelligence sharing within TREVI did 
not reach the frequency, significance, and 
efficacy of the Club de Berne’s systems. As 
Oberloskamp observes in regard to TREVI, the 
presence of officials from the ministries led to a 
partial withholding of sensitive information by 
the intelligence professionals, and important 
findings did not always reach the operative level 
of the security services.27 With the liaison 
offices largely ignored by parts of the security 
authorities, the information exchange was de 
facto functional only to a limited extent, at least 
for about the first decade of its operation. 
From Vienna to Quantico: The Proliferation of Multilateral 
Clubs 
                     










































Soon after the establishment of TREVI, a 
handful of further international mechanisms 
emerged with the aim to enhance multilateral 
counterterrorism cooperation. While these clubs 
did not reach the importance of the Club de 
Berne or TREVI, they will nevertheless be 
briefly introduced in this section. The author of 
this article argues that this system of informal 
institutions – or, described differently, the 
increasing institutionalization of informality – 
needs to be analyzed holistically in future 
research efforts in order to understand the 
emergence of multilateral counterterrorism that 
took place during the 1970s and the 1980s. 
Already in March 1976, the interior ministers of 
France, Great Britain, and the FRG established 
the Working Group Carlos. The working group 
was the result of two spectacular violent acts 
committed during 1975 by the Venezuelan 
militant Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, at the time an 
operative of the Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine – Special Operations Group 
(PFLP-SOG) and better known as “Carlos the 
Jackal”.28 In June 1975, Carlos had killed two 
officials of the French domestic intelligence 
service Direction de la surveillance du territoire 
(DST) and severely wounded a third during a 
confrontation at Rue Toullier in Paris. In 
December, the Jackal had led the commando 
raiding an OPEC meeting in Vienna and taking 
more than 60 hostages, including the oil 
ministers of the OPEC member states. The 
                     
28 On Carlos see the only authoritative biographical account by John Follain, Jackal: 
The Complete Story of the Legendary Terrorist, Carlos the Jackal (New York: 
Arcade, 1998). A well researched, although analytically weak, German-language 
history of Carlos and his comrades-in-arms is provided by Oliver Schröm, Im 
Schatten des Schakals: Carlos und die Wegbereiter des internationalen 






























Working Group Carlos was staffed with two 
representatives from the security services of 
each member state, who met periodically. They 
were tasked to piece together and analyze 
information on the whereabouts, activities, and 
intentions of Carlos and his comrades-in-arms. 
In 1978, representatives of the Italian security 
services joined the Working Group Carlos. 
Since then, the group was increasingly 
concerned with analyzing information on 
transnational terrorism more generally.29 A 
smaller and even more informal multilateral club 
compared to TREVI is the Club des Cinq, also 
known as de Club de Vienne, established in 
1978 by five Alpine countries. As it had been 
the case with the Working Group Carlos, the 
occasion leading to the group’s foundation was 
a specific, headline-grabbing terrorist incident. 
Immediately after the kidnapping of former 
Italian prime minister Aldo Moro by the Red 
Brigades in March 1978, the Italian interior 
minister met with his counterparts from Austria, 
Switzerland, France, Italy, and the FRG to 
coordinate border security measures in order to 
prevent that the kidnappers could bring Moro 
out of Italy. Like the Club de Berne and TREVI, 
the Club des Cinq was a multilevel institution. 
But while TREVI operated on the top level, the 
meso level, and the working level (levels 1-3), 
and the Club de Berne on the meso level and 
the working level (levels 2 and 3), the Club des 
Cinq operated on levels 1 and 2: in addition to 
the meetings of the interior ministers, a 
subordinate group composed of the chiefs of 
the five national police forces was convened 
semiannually. 
                     










































he Club des Cinq provided a forum for the 
exchange of particular counterterrorist 
information, especially on individuals suspected 
to support the PLO. Besides of information 
sharing, the club focused on enhancing police 
cooperation against terrorists and other 
criminals who would attempt to cross the Alpine 
countries’ borders. While a considerable 
overlap existed with the work of TREVI, the 
Club des Cinq allowed to integrate the non-EC 
members Austria and Switzerland into the 
emerging continental counterterrorism 
structure. In fact, Austria had not been part of 
any multilateral club before the creation of the 
Club des Cinq. Another basis of legitimacy was 
that the small size and large homogeneity of the 
group enhanced its members’ willingness to 
share and cooperate, compared to the much 
larger and more homogenous TREVI.30 
In 1979, representatives of security services 
from Great Britain (Metropolitan Police Special 
Branch), the Netherlands (Bijzondere Zaken 
Centrale of the Centrale Recherche 
Informatiedienst), the FRG (Abteilung 
Terrorismus of the Bundeskriminalamt), and 
Belgium (Gendarmerie) further set up the Police 
Working Group on Terrorism (PWGOT). The 
establishment of the group, apparently in 
response to the assassination of the British 
Ambassador to the Netherlands Sir Richard 
Dykes in 1976, was deemed necessary 
because its founding members felt that the 
                     
30 On the Club des Cinq see “Prospects for Counterterrorist Cooperation among 
Developed Countries”, Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, 23; “Terrorism 
Review”, 17 March 1983, 5; Didier Bigo, Polices en réseaux: l’expérience 
européenne (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 
1996), 88f; Serge A. Bonnefoi, Europe et sécurité intérieure: TREVI, Union 






























efforts within TREVI had not yet been leading to 
sufficient police cooperation on the operative 
level. Accordingly, the objectives of the very 
informal working group, which holds meetings 
twice a year, have been the exchange of 
information (on the operational level), officials 
(by promoting the secondment of officers), and 
expertise (through the organization of specialist 
seminars). In the mid-1990s, Peter Chalk 
concluded that the main value of the PWGOT 
had been “its role in promoting close working 
relationships and personal goodwill between 
the different national agencies involved in the 
fight against terrorism”.31 Until 2018, all EU 
member states as well as the Scandinavian 
countries joined the group, which still exists 
today.32 
Based on an initiative of the U.S. Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Working 
Group Quantico was established likewise in 
1979. This informal group differed from the 
other multilateral clubs in three central ways. 
First, with a membership composed of security 
services from Western European states, the 
United States, Canada, and Australia, it had a 
distinct transcontinental character. Second, the 
working group was not a European but a US-
led initiative, closely tied to the U.S. State 
Department and its Ambassador-at-Large for 
Counterterrorism. Third, reflecting its 
geographical composition, the Working Group 
Quantico focused on diaspora communities. 
                     
31 Peter Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-terrorism: The Evolving 
Dynamic (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 124. 
32 On the PWGOT see John Benyon, Policing the European Union: The Changing 
Basis of Cooperation on Law Enforcement, International Affairs 70/3 (1994), 511f; 
Bigo, Polices en réseaux, 90; Bonnefoi, Europe et sécurité intérieur, 163; Chalk, 










































Initially it dealt with terrorist violence by 
Croatian exiles, but like the Working Group 
Carlos, which had equally been set up to deal 
with a single terrorist threat, the sphere of 
Quantico was soon extended to other 
suspected terrorist actors, especially within the 
Palestinian and Armenian diasporas. 
Apparently, the Working Group Quantico would 
also be the first multilateral club to integrate 
Warsaw Pact states into the cooperative 
counterterrorism efforts that had emerged in the 
West since the early 1970s. The KGB began 
participating in certain Quantico work as early 
as 1986, and other Central and Eastern 
European countries followed suit at the end of 
the 1980s.33 
 
Figure 3: The emergence of multilateral 
counterterrorism cooperation: 1980 
The 1980s: A Decade of Consolidation 
                     
33 According to Bonnefoi, Europe et sécurité intérieur, 162f. On the Working Group 
Quantico more generally see also Bigo, Polices en réseaux, 89; Oberloskamp, 






























The discussion in the previous sections of this 
article shows that an increasingly complex 
multi-level system of overlapping 
counterterrorism networks had emerged until 
the 1970s came to close. This informal system 
of multilateral cooperation linked the countries 
of Western Europe and extended to the North 
American NATO allies USA and Canada, and 
even to Australia and Israel. Shortly after the 
turn of the 1980s, the founding of the Western 
Mediterranean Club marked the first effort to 
integrate Arab states into the emerging system 
of multilateral counterterrorism cooperation as 
well. It was first proposed in 1983 by the 
director of the Italian military intelligence service 
Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza 
Militare (SISMI), General Nino Lugaresi, 
reflecting Italy’s increased interest in bilateral 
and multilateral counterterrorism cooperation in 
the 1980s.  
The club was set up until the end of 1983 with 
Spain, France, Italy, Morocco, and Tunisia as 
charter members. Heads of their intelligence 
services met annually with the objective to 
identify common threats especially from 
Palestinian and Armenian terrorists, examine 
state-support for violent groups by Libya, Syria, 
Iran, and Iraq, and to enhance cooperation on 
the problem posed by the harboring of terrorist 
actors by third countries. Besides of this inter-
service cooperation, there is some evidence in 
the sparse source material that broader aspects 
of counterterrorist policy were discussed at the 
ministerial level.34 
                     
34 It seems that the Western Mediterranean Club has so far not been discussed in the 
academic literature. The account in this paper is based on partly declassified U.S. 
intelligence documents. See especially “Spain: Basque Terrorism and Government 










































The expansion of international counterterrorism 
cooperation has come in waves that 
corresponded to periods in which common 
fears of terrorism in Western Europe were 
particularly strong. After the first half of the 
1980s had seen general stagnation and only 
few new initiatives, the mid-1980s were marked 
by efforts to intensify bilateral as well as 
multilateral counterterrorism cooperation, and to 
expand intelligence sharing. This newfound 
eagerness among several Western European 
governments fell together with an accumulation 
of highly publicized attacks in large EC 
countries and signs of increased cooperation 
among certain terrorist actors, especially 
Western European leftist groups. 
The two primary multilateral institutions through 
which this revived interest in counterterrorism 
cooperation was channeled were TREVI and 
the Permanent Working Group on Terrorism 
newly founded by the EC foreign ministers. 
After the “initial enthusiasm” for TREVI had 
“waned to a worrying degree” in the first half of 
the 1980s, as the British Home Office 
recognized in May 1984,35 European leaders 
began invigorating TREVI under the Italian 
presidency in 1985. A British delegate to the 
Higher Officials meeting held in Rome in May 
1985 observed in his secret report that “senior 
officials now seem to be co-operating more fully 
                                            
Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, November 1984, p. 14, in: CREST, CIA General 
Records, 85S00316R, Box 3, Folder 11, Document No. 4-3; “Prospects for 
Counterterrorist Cooperation among Developed Countries”, Interagency 
Intelligence Memorandum, 7f, 23. 
35 “International Terrorism”, Memo from R.A. Harrington, F4 Division, UK Home Office, 






























in the face of serious terrorist threats” and that 
the meeting had “made clear the growing extent 
of co-operation between TREVI Member 
States”.36 
In April 1986, under the impression of the 
United States’ bombing of Libya – the 
superpower’s first military strikes legitimized as 
a defensive act against terrorism – the TREVI 
ministers decided to increase the frequency of 
their meetings from once to twice a year and to 
convene extraordinary meetings if events 
required. Already in September 1986, such an 
emergency meeting was held at the request of 
France, which was confronted by a series of 
deadly terrorist attacks at the time. At this 
gathering, the TREVI ministers agreed to a 
wider exchange of intelligence on terrorist 
activities and decided that a communications 
system dedicated to antiterrorist action would 
be set up to link their police forces.37 
Parallel to TREVI but under the political 
leadership of the EC foreign ministers (instead 
of the ministers responsible for domestic 
security) and within the formal structures of the 
EC, the Permanent Working Group on 
Terrorism was established in 1986 within 
European Political Cooperation (EPC), the 
foreign policy coordination system of the EC 
                     
36 “TREVI Senior Officials Meeting: May 1985”, Note for the Record, M.J.A. Partridge, 
UK Home Office, 12 June 1985, p. 2, in: HO 325/589, TNA. At the meeting of 
TREVI ministers in The Hague in May 1986, the British Home Secretary noted 
contentedly that the work of TREVI had been shifted “into a higher gear”. See 
“Policies on Counter Terrorism”, Memo from M.J.A. Partridge, UK Home Office, 1. 
37 “TREVI Group: Attitudes towards Syria”, EUR M86-20154, CIA, 2 December 1986, 
Annex “EC: Counterterrorist Cooperation”, pp. 2f, in: CREST, CIA General 










































member states.38 The trigger for 
institutionalizing counterterrorism within EPC 
was a specific violent incident in London. 
During an anti-Gaddafi protest at the Libyan 
embassy on St James’s Square on 17 April 
1984, shots were fired out of the embassy 
building, killing a Metropolitan Police officer and 
wounding eleven Libyan demonstrators. The 
incident, which the British government 
designated as terrorism, led to an eleven-day 
siege of the embassy and Great Britain decided 
to break diplomatic relations with Libya.39 The 
British government further reacted by launching 
a number of proposals to coordinate the fight 
against “state terrorism” within EPC, where an 
“ad hoc group on state-sponsored terrorism”, 
composed of experts, was set up to discuss the 
British initiative in May 1984.40 After discussion 
of the ad hoc group’s proposals by the Political 
Committee and then at the foreign secretary 
level, the EC heads of government agreed on a 
set of principles to increase cooperation against 
international terrorism, particularly where it 
involved the abuse of diplomatic immunity, at 
                     
38 If not indicated otherwise, the following account of the founding of the EPC’s 
Permanent Working Group on Terrorism is based on a summary analysis of 
numerous documents in HO 325/585, TNA, as well as “Terrorism: Discussion 
Paper”, UK Home Office, undated [April/May 1984], in: HO 325/586, TNA; 
“Cooperation TREVI”, Report from the Meeting of Senior Officials, Paris, 22 May 
1984, UK Home Office, pp. 1-2, in: HO 325/587, TNA; “TREVI Group: Attitudes 
towards Syria”, EUR M86-20154, Annex “EC: Counterterrorist Cooperation”, pp. 1-
3; “Western Europe: Ongoing Counterterrorist Cooperation”, EUR M87-20061, 
Office of European Analysis, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, 6 May 1987, pp. 3f, 
in: CREST, CIA General Records, 93T00643R, Box 2, Folder 97, Document No. 1-
0. 
39 See further Yehudit Ronen, Libya’s Conflict with Britain: Analysis of a Diplomatic 
Rupture, Middle Eastern Studies 42/2 (2006), 271-283. 
40 For a list of the proposals see “European Political Cooperation: Ad Hoc Group on 
State-Sponsored Terrorism”, Telegram from UK Embassy Paris to the Foreign and 






























the summit meeting in Dublin in December 
1984. 
While the St James’s Square incident was the 
immediate trigger for this initiative against state 
support for terrorism through EPC, it reflected 
the Western discourse on terrorism of the years 
1984-86, which conceptualized terrorism as 
essentially a “state-sponsored” phenomenon. At 
a seminal conference held in Washington in 
June 1984, U.S. Secretary of State George 
Shultz declared that a “league of terror” – 
consisting of Libya, Syria, Iran, and North Korea 
– controlled international terrorism and worked 
closely together to support and finance terrorist 
acts.41 In January 1986, the ad hoc committee 
on terrorism was replaced by the Permanent 
Working Group on Terrorism, which functioned 
as one of the regular working groups of EPC. 
Already in May 1986, the new working group 
also initiated a formal mechanism for third 
country contacts. This enabled for example the 
United States, which was barred from 
participation in EC groups, to develop a 
regularized liaison relationship.42 With the 
establishment of the EPC Working Group, 
counterterrorism became, for the first time, a 
distinct field of policy with a distinct body 
devoted to it within the formal institutions of the 
                     
41 George P. Shultz, The Challenge to the Democracies, in: Benjamin Netanyahu (ed.), 
Terrorism: How the West Can Win (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986), 18. 
On terrorism discourse during the Reagan administration more generally see 
Adrian Hänni, Terrorismus als Konstrukt: Schwarze Propaganda, politische 
Bedrohungsängste und der Krieg gegen den Terrorismus in Reagans Amerika 
(Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2018). 
42 “TREVI Group: Attitudes towards Syria”, EUR M86-20154, Annex “EC: 
Counterterrorist Cooperation”, pp. 1-3; “Western Europe: Ongoing Counterterrorist 
Cooperation”, EUR M87-20061, Office of European Analysis, Directorate of 
Intelligence, CIA, 6 May 1987, pp. 3f, in: CREST, CIA General Records, 










































EC. In light of the impending Brexit, it is not 
without irony that Great Britain was the state 
mainly responsible for this development. 
Likewise symptomatic for the mid-1980s wave 
expanding international cooperation against 
terrorism, Interpol extended its sphere of 
operation to counterterrorism. By its 
constitution, Interpol, a global organization 
tasked to enhance the cooperation of the 
national police forces that had been founded as 
early as 1923, was barred from cooperating on 
political crimes, and hence terrorist violence. In 
1984, the General Assembly eventually passed 
a resolution resolving that crimes outside a 
“conflict area” against “innocent civilians” could 
not be considered political, and encouraging 
members to share anti-terrorist information. The 
establishment of an International Terrorist Unit 
in 1986 consolidated this remarkable paradigm 
shift, which would eventually turn Interpol into 
an important forum to coordinate 
counterterrorism strategies of European police 
forces.43 
In addition to the strengthening of TREVI, the 
establishment of the EPC Working Group, and 
Interpol’s operational extension into counter-
terrorism, a new informal multilateral club was 
set up in the mid-1980s as well. Since 1984, 
leaders of the French Unité de coordination de 
la lute anti-terroriste (UCLAT)44 the Belgian 
Groupe Interforces Anti-terroriste (GIA), and the 
terrorism unit of the West German BKA formed 
the group Tripartite. The primary objective of 
                     
43 Chalk, West European Terrorism, 124f. 
44 “Coordination unit of the fight against terrorism”, an organization founded in 1984 and 






























this club was to analyze the links between 
Action directe (AD), the Red Army Faction 
(RAF), and the Cellules Communistes 
Combattantes (CCC) – leftist terrorist 
organizations in the three member countries – 
and according to Didier Bigo it became an 
important forum for the exchange of sensitive 
information on these terrorist actors, bypassing 
TREVI.45 
 
Figure 4: The emergence of multilateral 
counterterrorism cooperation: 1985 
The establishment of Tripartite in 1984 seems 
to mark a temporary endpoint to the formation 
of ever more informal institutions. In any case, 
an initiative to create a functionally “global” 
multilateral club, launched by the Italian 
government the following year, failed. The 
ambitious proposal, which was discussed 
among Western European leaders, aimed to 
                     
45 Bigo, Polices en réseaux, 91. See also “Terrorism Review”, 11 March 1985, GI TR 
85-005, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, pp. 9f, in: CREST, CIA General Records, 










































create a new informal body to enhance 
cooperation against terrorism, crime and drugs 
– problems that were increasingly perceived as 
linked in some Western states.46 “Security for 
Europe”, as this club was supposed to be 
named, was conceived to initially include the 
EC member states and combine at least 
TREVI, the Club des Cinq, and the Pompidou 
Group47, a multilateral club set up in 1971 for 
the examination of drug abuse and trafficking.  
The far-reaching proposal already envisaged 
the linking of national data banks and the joint 
formation of highly specialized operational 
cadres.48 However, no such “super” multilateral 
club was set up. The next expansion and 
qualitative modification of international 
counterterrorism cooperation, and the 
fragmented multilateral system consisting of 
more than a dozen formal and informal 
institutions that overlapped to a considerable 
                     
46   In 1986, U.S. President Ronald Reagan labeled terrorism and drugs as “twin evils”, 
and in the mid-1980s several European state actors shared the perception of a 
close link between terrorism, drug trafficking, and other forms of organized crime. 
See Ronald Reagan, Written Responses to Questions Submitted by Noticias de 
Mexico, 2 January 1986, in: Public Papers of the President of the United States: 
Ronald Reagan, 1986, Vol. 1, (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1987), 3-6. 
47 Members of the Pompidou Group (as of 1984) were Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, 
Sweden, Turkey, Norway, and Spain. The club consisted of two levels: (1) 
meetings of the ministers of foreign affairs, of the interior, of justice, of health, and 
of finance that took place every two years (top level/level 1); (2) permanent 
correspondents (working level/level 3). In 1980, the informal group was integrated 
into the institutional framework of the Council of Europe. 
48 On “Security for Europe” see three documents in HO 325/589, TNA: “Italian 
Proposal: ‘Security for Europe’”, Undated Memo [April/May 1985], UK Home Office; 
“’Security for Europe’: Plan for European Co-operation against Terrorism, Crime 
and Drugs”, Translation of Italian Proposal, undated [April 1985]; “Note of a 
Meeting between the Home Secretary and Mr. Scalfaro, Italian Minister of the 






























degree in their membership and in some cases 
also in their functionality, would occur only 
following the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and the 
establishment of the EU’s third pillar. 
Conclusions 
It is important to put the largely informal system 
of multilateral counterterrorism cooperation that 
emerged in the 1970s/1980s, and included 
diplomacy as well as practical collaboration, 
into perspectives. Rivalries, competition, and 
overlapping responsibilities hampered its 
effectiveness. Multilateralism was restricted by 
different economic interests and foreign policy 
priorities of national state actors as well as the 
latters concerns to lose sovereignty in a 
sensitive area, to compromise intelligence, or 
even to risk retaliation by terrorist groups. 
Nevertheless, as the CIA noted in 1983, the 
member services of the multilateral clubs 
agreed that “the integrated European security 
system that began to evolve during the 1970s 
has led to significant advances in practical 
cooperation on security issues, especially 
counterterrorism. These groups have extended 
the reach, supplemented the resources, and 
bolstered the capabilities of the member 
services and have made it much harder for 
terrorists to escape justice by fleeing across 
European borders.”49 Equally important, the 
multilateral clubs fostered trust and provided a 
space to build personal relationships between 
officials of the different national intelligence and 
security services. These resources built the 
basis for later, farther-reaching advancements 
in international cooperation.  
                     










































Counterterrorism was indeed an important 
driver, and provided necessary legitimation, for 
European cooperation in the sensitive field of 
domestic security, including intelligence 
sharing. The emerging system of international 
counterterrorism cooperation can thus be 
interpreted as a first step to the European 
integration of “internal security”, which had not 
been designed as a policy field for integration 
by the 1957 Treaty of Rome but would become 
the EU’s third pillar through the Maastricht 
Treaty of 1992.50 The 1970s therefore 
constituted an epochal threshold: the 
multilateral counterterrorism cooperation that 
emerged during this decade provides a hinge to 
today. It is the prequel to the present. To give 
but one example: in the 2010s the SIGINT 
Seniors, the multilateral counterterrorism club 
for signals intelligence agencies, is in its 
essence organized like the Club de Berne in the 
early 1970s. Annual meetings of the heads of 
the member services are complemented by 
working group collaboration and encrypted 
systems to exchange intelligence on terrorism. 
                     































Figure 5: Multilateral Clubs in the 1970s/1980s 
Although access to primary source material is 
still much restricted, a few preliminary 
conclusions can be drawn regarding the 
character of the multilateral clubs. First, these 
fora were informal settings, located outside of 
the EU/NATO institutions or any other 
established international organizations. This 
institutional quality guaranteed the secrecy that 
was necessary for successful international 
cooperation at the time. The fact that informal 
and largely secret institutions were the 
preferred settings for counterterrorism 
cooperation in the 1970s/1980s resulted 
primarily from three major historical 
circumstances: (1) Efforts to enhance 
cooperation and coordinate policies were 
blocked within the United Nations and other 










































multilateral diplomacy and/or practical 
cooperation. (2) The emerging informal 
counterterrorism system allowed for the 
integration of states that were not part of NATO 
or the EC – whether because they pursued an 
approach of formal neutrality (e.g. Switzerland, 
Austria) or because of geographical reasons 
(e.g. Australia, Israel). For varying 
considerations, the participation of these 
countries was seen as important for successful 
international counterterrorism cooperation. (3) 
Several European states were concerned that 
close open cooperation against Middle Eastern 
terrorism, especially with Israel, could expose 
their countries to economic repercussions by 
Arab states and to violent attacks by terrorist 
actors. The “veil of secrecy” provided a solution 
to this dilemma. The downside of these distinct 
advantages of informality and secrecy was a 
lack of transparency and accountability. The 
multilateral clubs operated largely outside of 
democratic oversight, as opposition parties, 
national and European parliaments, as well as 
the public received little or no information on the 
European security integration pursued by these 
institutions.51 
Second, the multilateral clubs were mostly 
“bottom-up” institutions. The Club de Berne (like 
KILOWATT) was an initiative directly from the 
intelligence services, and the respective 
governments were only informed after the fact. 
The involvement of low and mid-level 
professionals proved essential for the 
successful intelligence liaison through this 
club.52 Likewise, both agenda setting and 
                     
51 Cf. the observations of Oberloskamp, Codename TREVI, 277-279, on the 
problematic aspects of TREVI regarding democratic control and accountability. 






























decision making within TREVI occurred 
primarily on the subordinate levels. Through 
their proactive initiatives, the experts in the 
working groups (third level) had a very far-
reaching influence on the content of the 
decisions made by the ministers. Eva 
Oberloskamp therefore concludes that the 
formation of trans-governmental networks 
“below the threshold of high politics” constituted 
a significant strength of TREVI. 53 
Third, the multilateral clubs led to a significant 
extension of “horizontal intelligence sharing” 
both nationally and internationally. On the 
national level, the emerging international 
counterterrorism system brought police forces 
access to information that had previously been 
restricted to intelligence services. On the 
international level, the counterterrorism 
cooperation led to a major expansion of 
intelligence sharing between the services in 
Western Europe, North America, and Israel. 
Before the establishment of KILOWATT in 
1971, multilateral intelligence sharing in the 
First World had largely been restricted to the 
English-speaking countries, notably the “Five 
Eyes” SIGINT alliance (USA, Great Britain, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand), which goes 
back to the 1940s.54 In the 1960s, the same 
countries further set up the compartmentalized 
counterintelligence alliance CAZAB, a highly 
classified forum to exchange information on the 
KGB and the GRU, mainly regarding high-level 
Soviet penetration.55 
                     
53 Oberloskamp, Codename TREVI, 179. 
54 On the Five Eyes see Richard J. Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s 
Most Secret Intelligence Agency (London: HarperPress, 2010). 










































The secret history of international 
counterterrorism cooperation needs to – and 
can eventually – be written. The recent case 
studies on the Club de Berne and TREVI are 
important first steps. However, further research 
needs to go beyond case studies and take on a 
holistic approach. I propose that future case 
studies as well as comprehensive analyses 
should research multilateral clubs as three 
analytically distinct categories of informal 
communities: (1) as policy communities, in 
which common policies, strategies, and 
approaches in regards to terrorist violence are 
negotiated; (2) as security communities, which 
implement these counterterrorism policies 
through the organization of practical 
cooperation by the intelligence and security 
services, including intelligence sharing; (3) as 
epistemic communities, in which particular 
conceptualizations of terrorism as a common 
threat and, as a consequence, specific 
normative viewpoints on counterterrorism are 
formed and mutually reinforced.  
Studying multilateral clubs as epistemic 
communities raises questions of symbolic 
power56 and politicization within these 
institutions. Did Israel, as Guttmann asks, use 
the KILOWATT network to create the 
impression of a constant and omnipresent 
terrorist danger among Western European state 
actors in order to prevent their rapprochement 
with the PLO, silence further criticism of Israeli 
policies in the occupied territories, and give the 
appearance that Israel was indispensable for 
the security of European citizens?57 Did the 
                     
56 As conceptualized by Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (Oxford: Polity 
Press, 1992). 






























Reagan administration use the Working Group 
Quantico to spread its interpretation of 
international terrorism as covert warfare by 
socialist and radical Middle Eastern states that 
justified an increasingly militarized 
counterterrorism policy? Questions of this kind 
will have to be asked. 
The complex system of overlapping bilateral 
and multilateral institutions, which this article 
attempted to outline, has to be studied as a 
whole if we want to understand how 
international counterterrorism emerged during 
the last two decades of the East-West conflict 
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